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Public dissatisfaction with the failure of the juvenile justice sys-
tem to protect the public from harm to person and property has
prompted legal scholars, judges, police, lawyers, and correctional
officers to reexamine the system's goals and policies.' This reex-
amination should have resulted in an increased awareness of and
focus on the emotional and financial harm suffered by victims of
juvenile crime. Unfortunately, the contrary is true. Discussion
and debate concerning the "physical, emotional and financial
stresses" 2 unique to victims of juvenile crime are virtually nonex-
istent.3 This is particularly puzzling since statistics, which "barely
* Associate, Smith & Elliott, P.A., Saco, Maine. B.A., cum laude, Western New
England College, 1980; J.D., Vermont Law School, 1983. Member, Maine and Mas-
sachusetts Bars.
** General Attorney, Office of Administrative Law Judge, United States De-
partment of Commerce, Washington, D.C. B.S., Cornell University, 1977; J.D., cum
laude, Vermont Law School, 1983. Member, New York Bar.
1. There is vast disagreement among authorities as to precisely what "new"
goals and policies, if any, should be implemented. See generally Coates, Deinstitution-
alization and the Serious Juvenile Offender: Some Policy Considerations, 27 CRIME &
DELINQ. 477 (1981); Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Frame-
work for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REv. 791
(1982); Hayes & Johnson, Confining Wayward Youth: Notes on the Correctional Man-
agement of Juvenile Delinquents, 32 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 23 (November 1981); Kauf-
man, The Child in Trouble: The Long and Dificult Road to Reforming the Crazy-Quilt
Juvenile Justice System, 60 WASH. L.Q. 743 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kaufman, The
Child in Trouble].
These "modern-day reformists" and their new ideas are scrutinized in McNally,
Nearly a Century Later: The Child Savers-Child Advocates and the Juvenile Justice
System, 33 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 47, 51 (1982).
2. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT,
U.S. DEPT. OF JusncE 22 (1981) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT
CRIME].
3. The victim of juvenile crime is generally left with a worthless civil action
against an insolvent minor. Furthermore, in forty-eight states the common law effec-
tively precludes parental liability for the harmful acts of their children, except in very
narrow circumstances. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. In contrast, the
civil law rules adopted by Hawaii and Louisiana permit victims to recover damages
against a parent with few limitations. See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
See generally Comment, Parent and Child-Civil Responsibility of Parentsfor the Torts
of Their Children-Statutory Imposition of Strict Liability, 3 VILL. L. REv. 529 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Civil Responsibility of Parents].
The victim of juvenile crime is also faced with social and economic pressures which
2
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hint at the human misery caused by serious juvenile crime" reveal
that the nation's crime problem is a juvenile problem.4
In contrast to the juvenile justice system, the criminal justice
system has recognized that victims of crime are frequently victim-
ized not only by the perpetrator of the violent act, but also by a
criminal justice system unresponsive to the needs of victims.5 Al-
though the criminal justice system's interest in victims as "con-
sumers of justice' 6 is recent, and perhaps temporary, there has
been, nevertheless, a concentrated effort by the system to relieve
the victim from his financial and emotional burden. Professionals
within the criminal justice system have generally advocated a two-
fold approach to this problem: first, to protect the victim against
future harm by improving the efficacy of the system and, second,
may prevent or discourage suit by one member of a community against a parent
within the same community. This coupled with the humiliation and anger felt by the
victim of any crime, is an especially harsh burden placed on the victim of juvenile
crime.
4. Kaufman, Book Review, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1052, 1053 (1977). The "statistics
on the trend of juvenile crime are frightening by themselves, but the real effects on
society may be even more shocking then the numbers would lead us to believe." NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, RE-
PORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION l
(1976).
Since 1960, arrests ofjuveniles for violent crime have increased almost 250 percent,
more than double the comparable statistic for adults. See Kaufman, The Child in
Trouble, supra note 1, at 746. See also COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, US. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, How FEDERAL EFFORTS TO COORDINATE PRO-
GRAMS TO MITIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROVED INEFFECTIVE 1 (1975); cf.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY
DATA TO STUDY SERIOUS DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR, JUVENILE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE UNITED STATES: IT's TRENDS AND PATTERNS, MONOGRAPH ONE 71-72
(1981) (Although juvenile crime is substantial it has not increased in five years and is
identifiably less severe then youthful offenders (18 to 20 years old) or adult offend-
ers). See generally TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 2, at 81; U.S. DEPT,
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 334-40 (1980); FED-
ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 188, 194-95 (1978).
The crime statistics indicate that perpetration of major crimes by juveniles peaks in
mid-to-late adolescence. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SEN-
TENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 35-43
(1978).
5. See TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 2, at 22. In the 19th cen-
tury, the juvenile justice system became a separate and distinct entity from the adult
criminal justice system. The development of this separate judicial system for
juveniles was founded on the belief that children would be better served by "protec-
tion and treatment" than by "punishment." The juvenile justice process today, there-
fore, still possesses the characteristics and atmosphere of a civil, non-adversarial
proceeding, rather than that of a criminal adjudication. See generally A. PLATT, THE
CHILD SAVERS (2d ed. 1977); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Note, The Representation of Juveniles Before the Court:
A Look Into the Past and the Future, 31 CASE W.L. REV. 580 (1981).
6. Hagan, Victims Before the Law: A Study of Victim Involvement in the Criminal
Justice System, 73 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317 (1982).
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to make the victim as financially whole as possible.7 Since "vic-
tims of criminal acts suffer the same injury regardless of the age of
the perpetrators,"'8 these recommendations address issues of pub-
lic policy and legislation common to victims of juvenile crime as
well.
The first recommendation, to improve the efficacy of the sys-
tem, has a long political and social history in the United States.9
Although admirable in intent, it represents wishful thinking and
no more. Despite the best creative efforts of juvenile justice pro-
fessionals and millions of tax dollars spent by federal and state
governments,' 0 the rate of juvenile crime continues to rise."
There is, therefore, no reason to expect that future innovations
and expenditures will lessen the number of crimes committed by
juveniles in this country.
The second recommendation encourages legislation aimed at
making victims financially whole. Funded from the public cof-
fers, these "crime victims compensation statutes" theoretically
provide a "balm for the suffering of innocent victims of crime."' 12
Numerous states have enacted these statutes and Congress has
proposed similar legislation. 13 Yet, augmenting the role of the
criminal or juvenile justice system to include additional responsi-
bility for victims is doomed by a myriad of problems "ranging
from funding and financial considerations to eligibility require-
ments."' 14 Furthermore, similar to many government programs:
[V]ictim compensation is designed with the best of intentions,
and appears to cost relatively little to achieve a desirable goal.
7. See TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 2, at 87.
8. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislature Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dis-
mantling the 'Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 MINN. L. REV. 167, 169 (1980).
9. See generally supra notes 1 and 5.
10. Total expenditures by the states in 1977 was estimated at $707,732,000 for
public juvenile custody facilities and $384,327,000 for private juvenile custody facili-
ties. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
129 (1980); LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUS-
TICE, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY: ADVANCE REPORT ON THE JUVENILE DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY CENSUS OF 1974 5-6 (1977). In 1975, federal expenditures
on delinquency and related problems were estimated at between $92 million and $20
billion. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUS-
TICE, FIRST COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PRO-
GRAMS 3 (1976).
11. See supra note 4.
12. Meiners, Public Compensation of the Victim of Crime: How Much Would It
Cost? in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS 328 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Meiners, Public Compensation of the Victim.]
13. See generally Jones, The Costs of Compensation in THE COSTS OF CRIME 121
(C. Grey, ed. 1979); Hoelzel, - Survey of27 Victim Compensation Programs, 63 JUDI-
CATURE 485 (1980); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF VIOLENT
CRIME: POTENTIAL COSTS AND COVERAGE OF A NATIONAL PROGRAM (1977).
14. TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 2, at 91.
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In reality, victim compensation threatens to emerge as another
tentacle of leviathan, encompassing far more territory and dol-
lars then ever envisioned. Numerous similar stories have un-
folded in recent years, and victim compensation would seem
likely to offer an additional instance of bureaucratic growth.',
Thus, the inevitable result is the creation of a new bureaucracy
which will further overburden the already disgruntled taxpayer
while failing to reduce crime or provide, in many cases, financial
restitution.
In contemporary America, victims of juvenile crime and delin-
quency are in a position identical to that of victims of adult crime.
The purpose of both the criminal justice and juvenile justice sys-
tems is the deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment of
criminals. 16 Redress for the victim is not a feature in either sys-
tem. The victim who wants to recover his losses and simultane-
ously exact a measure of vindication has but one solution: he
must hire a lawyer and sue in a civil court. 17
There are, of course, limitations on the use of a civil remedy by
victims. In many cases the adult criminal or tortfeasor will be
judgment-proof, thus, the victim will not bother to litigate. Since
it is especially true that even fewer juveniles are capable of satisfy-
ing a judgment against them, the barrier to recovery is more insur-
mountable for the victim of a juvenile crime. In effect, the victim
of juvenile crime has no remedy.
Since the 1950's, state legislatures have attempted to overcome
this obstacle to recovery by providing victims of juvenile crimes
with a statutory means of financial redress. These civil statutes,
generally entitled "parental responsibility acts" or "parental lia-
bility acts"' 8 were enacted to serve two goals: (1) to compensate
victims of juvenile crimes by imposing vicarious liability on par-
ents of children who intentionally or maliciously harm the person
or property of another, and (2) to deter juvenile crime and delin-
quency by encouraging increased parental supervision. 19
15. Meiners, Public Compensation of the Victim, supra note 12, at 329.
16. See McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in AssESSING THE CRIMI-
NAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL PROcEss, 296 (1977).
17. .d. at 295-96. The author incisively and critically traces the treatment of vic-
tims by the American criminal justice system from "central to peripheral actor in the
system, from a prime beneficiary to an also-ran." Id. at 306.
18. Citations to the state statutes are set forth in Appendix I, infra. Appendix I
updates similar compilations which appear in Note, New Jersey Public School Paren-
tal Liability Act Held Constitutional- Board of Education v. Cafliero, 34 RUT. L. REv.
220, 224-26 (1981); Note, The Iowa Parental Liability Act, 55 IowA L. REv. 1037,
1037-38 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Iowa Act].
19. See Note, The lowa Act, supra note 18, at 1037. In a philosophical examina-
tion of the dispute between deontological and utilitarian moral theories, Professor
George P. Fletcher poses the purpose of tort law in these terms: "[D]o we require
tortfeasors to compensate their victims because the victims deserve a monetary surro-
Vol. 20
5
Prescott and Kundin: Toward a Model Parental Liability Act
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
1984] TOWARD A MODEL PARENTAL LIABILITY ACT 191
For thirty years, this legislative device has had the potential to
serve the financial as well as emotional needs of many victims of
juvenile delinquency. The use of vague and ambiguous terminol-
ogy in the acts, however, has vitiated their effectiveness. 20 The
Model Parental Liability Act, proposed in Part IV of this Article
and discussed in the Commentary section of Part V, seeks to elim-
inate many of the impediments to recovery, thereby encouraging
victims to seek the financial compensation and emotional vindica-
tion promised them in the statutes.
In order to understand the design and purpose of the Model
Act, the historical development and judicial interpretation of the
state acts must be examined. Part I, therefore, reviews the severity
of the common law restrictions on financial recovery against a
parent of a juvenile tortfeasor. Part II compares the common law
with the civil law of Louisiana and Hawaii, both of which have
long held parents liable for the torts of their children. Finally,
Part III analyzes the cases which have determined the constitu-
tionality of state parental liability acts.
I. THE COMMON LAW
At common law, parents are not liable for damage caused by
their children unless the damage can be attributed to some action
or inaction of the parents.21 As a general rule, the parent is liable
only if- (1) he directed the act, (2) he ratified the child's act by
acceptance, (3) the child was acting as his agent or servant, (4) the
child was entrusted with a dangerous instrumentalityper se, such
as a gun, or (5) the child was negligently entrusted with an auto-
mobile.22 The social policy underlying the severe limitations on
recovery against parents for the intentional torts of their children
is based on the belief that parents should not be burdened with
liability due to a child's incorrigibility or "nasty disposition." 23
This common law rule developed during the time of the leading
cases of Brown v. Kendall24 and Stanley v. Powell.25 Both held
there could be "no liability without fault. '26 Thus, "causation lia-
gate for their injuries or, alternatively, because we wish to stimulate changes in the
behavior that generates accidents?" Fletcher, Punishment and Compensation, 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 691, 692 (1981).
20. See Note, The Iowa Act, supra note 18, at 1038.
21. Id. at 1038-39.
22. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 871-73 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as W. PROSSER]. See generally Comment, Parental Liabilityfor a Child's Tor-
tiousActs, 81 DICK. L. Rv. 755 (1977).
23. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 873.
24. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
25. 1 Q.B. 86 (1891).
26. Note, Torts: Parent and Child- Liability of Parent for the Torts of Minor
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bility" was superceded by "culpa liability," and the standard re-
quired by the common law is now one of reasonable conduct.27
Proceeding on the theory of liability flowing from culpability, the
primary attention of the modem law "was diverted from the fact
and the extent of the sufferer's damage and became fixed upon the
wrongfulness of the actor's conduct. '28
In practice, therefore, and to the detriment of the victim, a par-
ent is liable only if the parent had notice of a specific type of
harmful conduct on the part of the child and an opportunity to
interfere or warn others of the danger.29 A thorough review of the
case law yields few instances where an innocent victim was able to
overcome this two-pronged standard and recover compensation.30
It is beneficial to compare the severity of the common law with
the civil law approach which recognizes and better serves the
needs of the victim.
II. THE CIVIL LAW
The civil law rule of parental liability presents a significant con-
trast to that of the common law. The civil codes of France, Que-
bec, Louisiana, and Hawaii have provided for parental liability
whereas common law jurisdictions have not.
Initially, it would be prudent to briefly examine the historical
roots which may account for the development of these differences.
One authority suggests that:
[H]ere in its unmodified form, we find an interesting and im-
portant difference between the common law and the civil law.
The accent of the former upon the notion of individual respon-
sibility might be said to illustrate the general emphasis of the
English common law upon the individual as seen through Ren-
Child, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 643, 646 (1933-34) [hereinafter cited as Note, Torts: Parent
and Child].
27. Id.
28. Id. The notions of "culpability" and "intent" derive from what Justice
Holmes described as "blameworthiness," that is liability arising out of conduct which
would be blameworthy in "the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and
reasonable prudence." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 4 (1923). See e.g., Goldman,
Restitution for Damages to Public School Property, 11 J. LAW & EDUC. 147, 149
(1982).
29. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 873.
30. There are many tragic examples of the severity and unfairness the common
law rule has on victims of juvenile crime and delinquency. Two recent, and espe-
cially egregious examples, occurred in Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272 (Ariz. 1973)
(victim suffered lacerated ear, multi-contusions and fractures when attacked by 14
year-old with a lengthy history of violent conduct) and Moore v. Crumpton, 295
S.E.2d 436 (N.C. 1982) (victim raped at knifepoint by 17 year-old who had long his-
tory of mental illness and drug problems). In both cases, the children were released
from detention facilities and returned home. The courts held that the parents could
not have "anticipated" the conduct of their child.
[Vol. 20
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aissance and English Reformation thought. The civil law's pre-
occupation with the notion of family solidarity, received from
the Roman law, is a theme which runs throughout the codes.31
Fundamentally, and of immediate importance here, the distinc-
tion may be summed up as the difference between the common
law doctrine of "no liability without fault" and the civil law con-
cept that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it
shall fall on him who acted."32
Hawaii and Louisiana both enacted parental responsibility acts
long before the adoption of these laws by the common law states.
Hawaii adopted the civil code rule in 1884,33 yet the Hawaii
Supreme Court has never directly interpreted the statute.3 4 Prior
to 1916, the statute was examined in three cases. First, the federal
district court held that the statute did not impose liability when
the child, because of young age, was not responsible for his acts.35
A second court held that the father is liable in every case where
the infant would be liable at common law.36 Finally, the court
held that the statute could not impose liability for breach of
contract.
37
Louisiana, unlike Hawaii, has an extensive history of litigation
in this field. Article 2318 of the Louisiana Civil Code,38 enacted
in 1804 and modeled after the French statute, required parental
negligence for liability. The parent was thus able to raise, as an
affirmative defense, his inability to prevent the child from causing
3 1. Stone, Liabilityfor Damage Caused by Minors: A Comparative Study, 5 ALA.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1952).
32. Note, Torts: Parent and Child, supra note 26, at 646. For a fascinating and
scholarly discussion of the development and history of the common and civil laws
throughout the world, see Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Civil and Com-
mon Law, 16 Nw. U. L. REv. 163, 268 (1921-22) & 17 Nw. U. L. REv. 187, 416 (1923-
24).
33. See HAwAI REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976). The Hawaii statute is unique because
it permits victims to recover for all torts "regardless of whether based upon negligence
or intentional acts." Letter from Steven J. Trecker, Esq., to lead authors (November
3, 1982) (Trecker was plaintiffs counsel in Bryan v. Kitamura, discussed infra notes
138-55 and accompanying text) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Steven J. Trecker].
34. Since Hawaii did not formally become a state until 1958, the three cases dis-
cussed infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text were decided by the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii.
The constitutionality of the Hawaii statute has been upheld on at least two occa-
sions by the state trial courts. See Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. 394, 396 n. 5 (D.
Hawaii 1982).
35. Day v. Day, 8 Hawaii 715 (1891).
36. Victoria v. Palama, 15 Hawaii 127 (1903).
37. Rathburn v. Kaio, 23 Hawaii 541 (1916)
38. The Lousiana Parental Responsibility Act holds the father solely liable while
he is alive, unless custody of the minor has vested in the mother at his death or by
operation of law. See e.g., Semien v. State Farm Mutual Ant. Ins. Co., Inc., 398 So.
2d 161, 164 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Guidry v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., Inc.,
201 So. 2d 534-36 (La. Ct. App. 1967), appeal denied, 203 So. 2d 557 (La. 1967).
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the damage. In that same year, and for reasons that remain an
historical mystery, the Louisiana code was amended to repeal that
provision.39
Early Louisiana cases held the parent to be liable whether the
parent "could or could not have prevented the damage and re-
gardless of whether the child himself could be held liable to the
injured party."40 However, in 1934 the Louisiana Supreme Court
revised its interpretation of the statute and found that a parent
could not be held liable if the child was legally incapable of
fault.4 1 Thus, only if the child was at fault and could be held lia-
ble to the injured party did liability automatically attach to the
parent.42 Absent fault and liability of the child, the parent must
be personally negligent to incur liability.
In a line of cases ending in 1975,4 3 the Louisiana Supreme
Court overturned their earlier decision and its progeny and rein-
stated the rule that a parent is liable regardless of his ability to
prevent the acts of the child. Moreover, the child's lack of capac-
ity to be at fault no longer constituted a defense against liability.44
Therefore, under Article 2318 the only available defenses are a
"showing of fault by a victim, fault by a third person, or a fortui-
tous event.' '45 The rule finally expressed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court is consonant with the intent of the Louisiana stat-
ute and the policy underlying the civil law that the victim should
not bear the loss between two "innocent" parties.
Fifty years ago, the Louisiana cases and the civil law in general
were criticized for presuming that "liability is a natural corollary
of the relation of parent and child and that its imposition might
have a socially healthful result."46 It was further argued that:
39. See Note, Torts: Parent and Child, supra note 26, at 644-45.
40. Comment, Civil Responsibility of Parents, supra note 3, at 532 (footnote
omitted).
41. Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934).
42. Id.
43. Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975). (Six year old boy struck pedes-
trian with his bicycle injuring her. Father strictly liable whether or not he could have
prevented the act.)
44. Id. at 277.
45. Ryle v. Potter, 413 So. 2d 649, 651 (La. Ct. App. 1982). (Ten year old boy
shot another boy with air rifle and strict liability imposed on boy's parents.)
46. Note, Torts: Parent and Child, supra note 26, at 647. In contrast, one com-
mentator, in an article favoring parental liability under the so-called "automobile
doctrine," argued that:
[We are perfectly aware that this is a period in which parents do very little
forbidding. We are aware also that the pernicious philosophy of education
now dominant, which apothesizes self-expression, is interpreted to permit
the child to make an unrestrained fool of himself in as many ways as his
immature impulses may dictate. But that philosophy does not excuse par-
ents for letting the child make a nuisance of himself to others. .... [w]e
offer the suggestion that inasmuch as parents, in our legal system, have hith-
[Vol. 20
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[I]t has been the general experience that a standard of reason-
able conduct can adequately deal with the ordinary situation of
our economic and social life. As applied today the common
law rule would seem satisfactorily to protect the third person
from loss resulting from the acts of irresponsible minors.47
Today, in hindsight, these thoughts appear both optimistic and in-
correct. The rate of mayhem and destruction has not been
checked under the common law nor have the victims been "ade-
quately" redressed.
Moreover, the purpose of the civil law and parental responsibil-
ity acts is not confined to modification of the juvenile's behavior,
although this is a legitimate legislative purpose. In fact, an honest
appraisal would lead to the conclusion that these statutes will have
an insignificant effect on delinquent behavior. Rather, the most
important social and legal goal of these laws is to compensate the
victim of juvenile offenses. In this respect, the civil law and pa-
rental liability acts serve the needs of the public and the victim.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Since 1961, few reported cases have examined the constitution-
ality of state parental liability acts. The paucity of decisions by
higher state courts may reflect the fact that trial courts have had
little trouble disposing of constitutional challenges to the acts. It
may also indicate that many victims of juvenile crime and their
attorneys are simply unaware of the existence of these statutes.
Regardless of the reason for the scarcity of reported decisions, ju-
dicial analysis of the constitutional issues in those decisions avail-
able, with few exceptions, have rarely been sophisticated or clear.
Generally, the constitutionality of these statutes are challenged
under the fourteenth amendment: first, that the statutes deprive
parents of property without due process of law by imposing liabil-
ity without fault,48 and, second, that the statutes deny equal pro-
erto had all the right and none of the responsibilities that other legal systems
attribute to them, it is not excessive nor unfair to burden them with this
particular responsibility-harmonious as it is with the exceptional principle
above described, viz., responsibility for children's harmful acts which could
have been prevented by watchful exercise of the parental power.
Wigmore, Torts: Parent's Liability for Child's Torts, 19 Nw. U. L. REv. 202, 205
(1924-25).
47. Note, Torts: Parent and Child, supra note 26, at 647. The author also argued
that the civil law rule "seems quite as likely to foster birth control." Id. Subsequent
study of the population growth in the civil law states may verify this conclusion.
48. Dean Prosser defined vicarious liability, as follows:
A is negligent, B is not. "Imputed negligence" means that, by reason of
some relation existing betweenA and B, the negligence ofA is to be charged
against B, although B has played no part in it, has done nothing whatever to
aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to prevent it.
10
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tection under the law. Excepting one Georgia case,49 all reported
decisions have upheld the constitutionality of these acts. The
courts have concluded that the legislative purpose of the parental
responsibility acts reflects either one or both of the two goals: the
compensation of the victim, or the deterrence of juvenile crime.
These purposes are a legitimate exercise of the state police power.
Prior to 1970, the constitutionality of parental liability acts was
challenged only three times.50 A Texas appeals court, in 1961, up-
held the constitutionality of the Texas statute. The court, how-
ever, did not engage in a clear, well-reasoned analysis of the
constitutional issues. The court found the statute "reasonable"
and seemed to equate reasonableness with constitutionality.5' The
court also appeared favorably impressed with the fact that other
states had similar statutes, and that law review commentators
viewed these statutes as serving a positive purpose.5 2 In addition,
the court focused on the compensatory aspects of the statute
rather than its possible deterrent effects on juvenile delinquency,
and concluded that parents, not the innocent victims, should bear
the loss. 53
Two years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed a
challenge to the constitutionality of the North Carolina act.54 In
contrast to the Texas court, the North Carolina Supreme Court
emphasized the punitive nature of the statute which limited pa-
rental liability to five hundred dollars.55 Because this amount
would be inadequate to compensate many victims, the court rea-
soned that the statute "fails to serve any of the general compensa-
tory objectives of tort law."'56
W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 458.
49. Corley v. Lewliss, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971). See infra notes 65-78
and accompanying text. (Twelve year old boy riding a bike hit another boy in the
forehead with a brick or stone).
50. General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963); Kelly v.
Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (rex. Civ. App. 1961); Mahaney v. Hunter Enter., Inc., 426
P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967).
51. Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). (Fifteen year
boy stole car and drove it at 110 miles per hour during a police chase, damaging the
car). The Texas Court of Civil Appeals recently refused to reverse Kelly and held
that the Texas statute does not deny "equal protection under the law or due process of
law." Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). (Two minor
girls vandalized three houses, court held $5,000 limit of recovery would be applied to
each act.)
52. Kelly, 346 S.W.2d at 437.
53. Id. at 438.
54. General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963) (the statute
is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (1961)).
55. In 1981, the statutory limit to recovery was raised to $1,000. See Appendix,
infra.
56. General Ins. Co., 259 N.C. at 323, 130 S.E.2d at 650. (Eight year old boy set
fire to the drapes in the school).
(Vol. 20
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Nevertheless, the North Carolina court held that the statute did
not violate provisions of the state constitution nor the fifth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. According to the court,
the state can legitimately enact punitive statutes aimed at cur-
tailing juvenile crime as an exercise of its police power.5 7 The
court also noted that the child's parents were given the opportu-
nity for a full hearing and adjudication.5 8 The decision was un-
clear regarding the applicability of the fifth amendment, or
whether the statute complied with procedural safeguards required
by the fourteenth amendment.5 9 Moreover, the court did not ad-
dress the question of whether a statute with a high or unlimited
amount of recovery would also be punitive and, hence, withstand
a due process challenge. 60
The Wyoming Supreme Court relied on these two cases to up-
hold the constitutionality of the Wyoming statute.6' The court
summarily stated that "courts will not declare a statute unconsti-
tutional unless the unconstitutionality is clear."' 62 In this case, de-
fendants also raised an equal protection argument. They
challenged the statute's imposition of liability upon the "natural
parents" only, claiming that the differential treatment between
natural parents and other custodians violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.63 The court rejected this ar-
gument on the ground that restricting liability to a natural parent
was reasonable and that all those within the class were treated
equally.64
In 1971, the parental responsibility act of Georgia65 was held
unconstitutional in Corley v. Lewliss. 66 In Corley, the minor child,
Bruce Brady, age 12, was involved in a fight which resulted in
head injuries to the minor plaintiff, Clark Lewliss. Bruce Brady
threw a brick or stone which struck the plaintiff in the forehead.
The plaintiff brought suit against the minor's mother and uncle,
with whom the defendant lived.
The Georgia Supreme Court held the statute violated the due
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Note, The Iowa Act, supra note 18, at 1042.
60. Id.
61. Mahaney v. Hunter Enter., Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (,Vyo. 1967). (Thirteen and
sixteen year old boys broke a plate glass window in a store.) See generally Note,
Parental Tort Liability, 1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 299 (1966).
62. Mahaney, 426 P.2d at 444.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-13 (1968), repealed by GA. CODE ANN. § 51-52-53
(1982), amended by GA. CODE ANN. § 51-52-53 (Supp. 1983).
66. 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971).
12
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment.67 The Georgia court
distinguished cases upholding parental liability statutes on the
ground that the Georgia statute permitted unlimited recovery,
while the other state statutes imposed limitations on the amount
recoverable. 68 The court reasoned that the limitations on recovery
imposed in the Texas, North Carolina, and Wyoming acts indi-
cated that the acts were penal in purpose rather than compensa-
tory. 6 9 It should be noted, however, that the Texas court had
focused solely on the compensatory, not the deterrent effect of the
Texas statute.70
The Georgia court concluded that since the statute permitted
unlimited recovery, the act was not penal, but compensatory.7'
The court declared that the imposition of vicarious liability, based
solely on the parent-child relationship, "would deprive the de-
fendant of property without due process of law, would authorize
recovery without liability, and would compel payment without
fault. 72 As such, the statute violated the due process clauses of
the state and federal Constitutions.
The Georgia court held that the statute violated due process
under the state constitution as well as the fourteenth amendment
of the federal Constitution. The court's interpretation of due pro-
cess, however, was in direct conflict with the United States
Supreme Court's treatment of substantive due process since
1934.73 The Supreme Court continues to apply substantive due
process analysis, but only where the government seeks to affect
civil liberties, or where the Court determines that a right is "fun-
damental. ' 74 Rights which the Court has recognized as funda-
mental include:
most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the right to fairness
in the criminal process, the right to privacy, including some
freedoms of choice in matters of marriage, sexual relations and
child bearing, the right to travel, the right to vote, the freedom
67. Id. at 751, 182 S.E.2d at 770.
68. The current version of the Georgia statute limits parental liability to
$5,000.00. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-3 (Supp. 1983).
69. Corley, 227 Ga. at 749, 182 S.E.2d at 769.
70. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
71. Corley, 227 Ga. at 750, 182 S.E.2d at 770.
72. Id. at 750-51, 182 S.E.2d at 770, (quoting Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 633, 641, 10 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1940)). The court relied on three prior
decisions: Frankel v. Cone, 214 Ga. 733, 107 S.E.2d 819 (1959); Buchanan v. Heath,
210 Ga. 410, 80 S.E.2d 393 1954; and Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190
Ga. 633, 10 S.E.2d 46 (1940) in holding that liability created solely by nature of the
statute without any fault by the plaintiff was unconstitutional.
73. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
74. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 409 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. See generally L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2 (1978).
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of association and some aspects of fairness in the adjudication
of individual claims against the government procedural due
process rights7
5
The Georgia court did not point to any fundamental right violated
by the statute. It merely concluded that the liability attributed to
the act of the child deprives a parent of property without fault,
and thus violates due process. 76
If the court considered property to be a fundamental right, it
failed to state a rationale supporting this conclusion. Moreover,
the ownership of propertyper se is not a fundamental right. It is,
instead a procedural due process matter.77 Since the statute did
not deny the defendants any of the elements of a full adjudication,
the integrity of procedural due process was maintained.
In the absence of a fundamental right, due process requires only
that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall bear a rational relationship to the
legislative objective sought.78 The Georgia court did not examine
the statute to determine if the application of vicarious liability to
compensate a victim was an irrational exercise of the state's police
power. Furthermore, the court did not consider the point at which
the statutorily imposed limitation on recovery crosses the arbitrary
line separating penal from compensatory acts. How much recov-
ery then, is too much recovery?
In no other state have the courts declared their respective pa-
rental liability acts unconstitutional. In Hayward v. ]?amick,79 the
Georgia Supreme Court noted, eleven years after finding the pa-
rental liability act unconstitutional, that "Corley stands alone
among a number of opinions dealing with the constitutionality of
parental responsibility statutes .... ',80 The court then distin-
guished its earlier decision and upheld a revised Georgia statute,8'
finding the five hundred dollar ceiling on liability manifested the
punitive purpose of the statute.82 The court found that the state
75. See NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 74, at 409.
76. Corley, 227 Ga. at 750-51, 182 S.E.2d at 770.
77. See NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 74, at 490-91.
78. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
79. 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
80. Id. at 843, 285 S.E.2d at 698.
81. 1976 Ga. Laws 511, § 2, amended by GA. CODE ANN. § 51-52-53 (1982),
amended by GA. CODE ANN. § 51-52-53 (Supp. 1983). The 1976 version of the Act
reduced the liability to a maximum of $500.00
82. Hayward, 248 Ga. at 843, 285 S.E.2d at 699. Five years after Corley, the
Georgia Assembly amended the Georgia code sections 105-13 to limit recovery to five
hundred dollars. Following the court's decision in Hayward, the Georgia Assembly
again amended the revised statute, sections 51-52-53, and raised the limitation on
recovery to five thousand dollars. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-52-53 (Supp. 1983). It re-
mains to be seen whether the court will hold that a $5,000 limitation manifests the
punitive purpose of the statute. In the alternative, the court could overturn or narrow
14
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has a legitimate interest in controlling juvenile crime, and that
"there is a rational relationship between the means used of (im-
posing liability upon parents of children who willfully or mali-
ciously damage property) and this object. '8 3 Moreover, it is
noteworthy that the Georgia Supreme Court may have been dis-
satisfied with its earlier decision. The court stated, "while we do
not reaffirm Corley, we do hold that the legislature has met the
objections to Corley in the new statute with which we now deal."'8 4
Other courts have engaged in more traditional and thorough
due process analyses following the finding of unconstitutionality
by the Georgia court. These courts have consistently maintained
that either or both, the deterrence of juvenile crime, and the com-
pensation of the victim are legitimate legislative ends, and paren-
tal responsibility acts are a valid means of achieving these goals.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, after reviewing the cases pre-
viously discussed, held that the Maryland statute reflected the
state's legitimate interest in legislating a matter of general welfare
and was, therefore, constitutional.8 5 The court reasoned that:
The due process clause does not, anymore than the contract
clause, inhibit a state from insisting that all contract and prop-
erty rights are held subject to the fair exercise of the police
power .... The exercise of the power is fair when the purpose
is a proper public one and the means employed bear a real and
substantial relation to the end sought and are not arbitrary or
oppressive.86
The Connecticut Court of Common Pleas upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Connecticut parental responsibility act in 1977,87
and acknowledged that the statute had a dual purpose of cur-
tailing juvenile delinquency and compensating victims. 8 The de-
fendants raised two equal protection claims. They contended that
Corley by declaring that a compensatory purpose, with any ceiling on recovery, is a
constitutional exercise of the state's police power.
83. Hayward, 248 Ga. at 843, 285 S.E.2d at 699.
84. Id. (emphasis added). In the eleven years between Corley and Hayward, the
composition of the Georgia Supreme Court changed completely, such that not one
justice from Corley participated in the Hayward decision.
85. In re Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 179, 315 A.2d 110 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974). (Two
brothers assaulted a man by striking him with their fists.)
86. Id. at 188, 315 A.2d at 115 (quoting Allied Am. Co. v. Comm'r, 219 Md. 607,
616, 150 A.2d 421, 427 (1959) (citations omitted). The court also questioned the
soundness of the Georgia court's reasoning by Corley. The court remarked, "even
acceptance of the inference suggested in Corley, that limitation upon the amount of
vicarious parental liability would affect the constitutionality of a legislative right to
impose it, the appellants here are not aided." Id. at 187, 315 A.2d at 115 (emphasis
added).
87. Watson v. Gradznik, 34 Conn. Supp. 7, 373 A.2d 191 (C.P. 1977). (Suit
against parents of a minor for wrongful conversion of property).
88. Id. at 10, 373 A.2d at 193.
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the statute unconstitutionally differentiated between parents and
all others who might be responsible for children. In response, the
court held that the legislature could find a reasonable basis for
such differentiation. Since parents are in the best position to exert
the most control over their children, thus fulfilling the deterrence
goal of the statute.8 9 They also argued that the statute interfered
with their fundamental right to raise and bear children. The court
concluded that parents' liability for the torts of their children does
not interfere with this right.90 The court stated that with the
"right to bear and raise children comes the responsibility to see
that one's children are properly raised so that the rights of others
are protected." 91 The court held that both purposes, deterrence
and compensation, bear a rational relationship to the preservation
and promotion of the public welfare.92
Similar issues were raised in an Ohio case, though the Ohio
Court of Appeals more thoroughly addressed the due process
claim.93 As such, the court held compensation to property owners
for damage caused by willful misconduct was a legitimate state
goal and the imposition of a $2,000 judgment on the parents was
reasonably related to that end.94 The court noted, however, that
the limitation on recovery may constitute a civil penalty since
some victims will not be fully compensated, thereby frustrating
the statute's compensatory purpose.95 Nevertheless, the court held
that although the statute contained a limitation on recovery, the
monetary amount was reasonable, practical, and usually sufficient
to compensate the victim. 96
The defendants argued the Act could not, in fact, be shown to
deter juvenile crime, and therefore was not rationally related to
that goal. The court found it unnecessary to examine this argu-
ment since compensation was, by itself, a legitimate state end.97
The court added that a low recovery limit could compel it to de-
termine if the deterrence of juvenile delinquency was a worth-
while objective in itself-a conclusion which would force the
court to analyze the statute's actual effect on juvenile
delinquency. 98
89. Id. at 8, 373 A.2d at 192.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 10-11, 373 A.2d at 193.
93. Rudnay v. Corbett, 7 Ohio Op. 3d 416, 374 N.E.2d 171, (Ct. App. 1977).
(Action against custodial person for willful damage of a car by two minors.)
94. Id. at 419, 374 N.E.2d at 175.
95. Id. at 419 n.5, 374 N.E.2d at 175 n.5.
96. Id. at 419, 374 N.E.2d at 175.
97. Id. at 420, 374 N.E.2d at 175.
98. Id.
16
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In 1979, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that the state's pa-
rental responsibility act was a constitutional exercise of the state's
police power.9 9 The defendants raised a number of claims in sup-
port of their constitutional challenge. They asserted that the law
was unconstitutional, because it deprived a parent of property
without due process of law by imposing liability on a parent who
did not commit the tort.1' ° The defendants also ingeniously ar-
gued that in other liability without fault statutes, such as work-
mens' compensation, the party held liable reaps a benefit from the
activities of the person for whom he is held legally responsible.
Thus, in those situations it seems justifiable to impose some of the
costs of these activities on the party held liable. 10 1 The defendants
claimed, therefore, that the vicarious liability aspect of the paren-
tal responsibility act is flawed because the person vicariously lia-
ble (the parent) is not benefiting from the tortfeasor's activities
(the child's offense).I 2 The court did not directly respond to this
argument but merely found that no violation of due process had
occurred. l0 3
Another argument was asserted that holding only parents liable
creates an unreasonable classification, thus violating the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0 4 The defend-
ants argued that other societal groups have a strong influence on
the conduct of children, thereby limiting the degree of parental
control over their children.'0 5 The court responded simply that
the unequal treatment in the statute had a "reasonable basis in
fact." 0 6
In their second equal protection argument, defendants claimed
that the statute is an invalid exercise of the state's police power. ' 0 7
The defendants contended that the statute is not rationally related
99. Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193, 195, 387 N.E.2d 341, 343-44
(App. Ct. 1979). (Eleven year old boy drove a car off the road causing damage to the
car). The Vanthournout decision is analyzed in Fish, Constitutional Law/Parental Re-
sponsibility, 68 ILL. BAR. J. 474 (March 1980).
100. Vanthournout, 68 Ill. App. at 194, 387 N.E.2d at 342.
101. Id. Other examples given of no-fault liability accompanied by a benefit on
the part of the liable party are: the liability of an operator of a dram shop, the liabil-
ity of a seller of food which may become adulterated, and the vicarious liability im-
posed under the "Family Purpose Doctrine." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 196, 387 N.E.2d at 343-44. Defendant's argument was flawed in sev-
eral respects. Vicarious liability has been justified on other grounds, including delib-
erate allocation of risk, distribution of cost through pricing, and liability insurance.
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 969.
104. Vanthournout, 68 IlM. App. at 195, 387 N.E.2d at 343.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 196, 387 N.E.2d at 343 (quoting Anderson v. Wagner, 61 Ill. App. 3d
822, 378 N.E.2d 805, 809 (App. Ct. 1978)).
107. Id. at 195, 387 N.E.2d at 343.
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to the punitive goals of the statute, since parental control over ju-
venile behavior is vague and limited. 108 The court did not explore
this issue but summarily concluded that the statute is a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power, and is, therefore, proper. 10 9
The defendants also questioned the scope and coverage of the
statute, asserting that torts committed by a juvenile outside the
boundaries of the statute's definition of a minor go uncompen-
sated. 110 The court did not address this issue at all.
In a recent decision concerning a New Jersey statute," the is-
sues raised by the parties were somewhat different from those dis-
cussed in the previous cases. The New Jersey statute applied only
to parents or guardians of minor children in public schools who
damage public school property. 1 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court first considered the scope of the statute. It found that liabil-
ity was not based solely on the parent-child relationship, but ap-
plied also to those who have custody and control of the child, and
are responsible for the child's conduct." 3 Furthermore, although
the statute contains no explicit reference to liability based on the
willful or malicious conduct of minors, the court read these restric-
tions into the statute." 4 The court justified this finding by con-
cluding that this was consonant with one of the legislative
purposes--deterrence of vandalism." 5 Thus, the legislature "was
concerned not solely with compensating school boards for damage
to property but also with deterring delinquent behavior. Permit-
ting the school board to recover from the parents where a child
has caused damage negligently or without fault would not further
the purpose of deterrence in any way."" 6
The court then dealt with the constitutional issues raised by de-
fendants. First, defendants claimed that the statute violated due
process, asserting that no rational relationship exists between the
purpose of deterring delinquent behavior and the imposition of
108. Id.
109. Id. at 196, 387 N.E.2d at 343-44.
110. Id. at 343.
111. Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799 (1981), appeal
dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 560 (1981). (Parents of three public school pupils held vicari-
ously liable for damage to school.)
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 37-3 (West Supp. 1981). The New Jersey Parental
Liability Act is embodied in sections 2A:53A-15 of the New Jersey code and imposes
liability upon parents for willful or malicious injury by a child to real or personal
property. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-15 (West Supp. 1982-83). Both section 18A:
37-3 and section 2A: 53A-15 contain no limitation on recovery against the parent.
113. Cafjlero, 86 N.J. at 316, 431 A.2d at 803.
114. Id. at 316-17, 431 A.2d at 803.
115. Id. at 317, 431 A.2d at 803.
116. Id.
18
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liability on parents.1 7 In response, the court discussed vicarious
liability and its application in other contexts and the rationale be-
hind it. The court noted that, "in most instances, strict or vicari-
ous liability has its sources in a public policy decision that the
person liable is in a position to spread the cost of injury over a
large portion of the public.""18 The court found that the legisla-
ture could reasonably believe that holding parents liable for the
willful and malicious acts of their children would induce parents
to exercise more control, thereby deterring juvenile delinquency
and minimizing the cost to the public.119 The court also upheld
the statute's unlimited recovery, stating that a maximum ceiling
would be contrary to the compensatory purpose of the statute. 20
Defendants also suggested that their fundamental right to bear
children is burdened by the parental responsibility act. The court
dismissed this claim stating, "the effect of the vicarious liability
statute on the decisions of individuals to bear and beget children
is speculative at best" and that "[o]ther laws impose financial bur-
dens on parents" as well.' 2' The court stated that the strict scru-
tiny standard was not triggered since no fundamental right or
suspect classification was implicated. 122 Thus, in order to with-
stand an equal protection challenge, the statute need only ration-
ally relate to a legitimate state purpose that does not constitute
invidious discrimination. 123 Furthermore, the court held that the
difference in treatment between parents of public school children
and parents of other children was rationally related to a legitimate
117. Id. at 318, 431 A.2d at 804.
118. Id. at 319, 431 A.2d at 804.
119. Id. at 319-20, 431 A.2d at 804-05. The court suggested that the resolution of
juvenile crime must begin with the belief that:
[P]arents should take responsibility for their children's activities. This re-
sponsibility comes with one's status as a parent and reaches legal and moral
dimensions in our society. The laws of this State, if not the higher princi-
ples, may properly provide incentives for parents to fulfill their role in the
hves of their children.
Id. at 327, 431 A.2d at 807.
120. Id. at 321, 431 A.2d at 805.
121. Id. at 323, 431 A.2d at 806. Defendants also asserted that free education is a
fundamental right and that the New Jersey act unduly interferes with that right. Re-
lying on San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973), the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that no such federal right to a free education exists. Caf-
jfero, 86 N.J at 323, 431 A.2d at 806.
The court noted that the New Jersey constitution does protect, as a fundamental
right, the right to a free education. Id. The court concluded that the statute does not
burden this fundamental right since the "remote potential for vicarious liability of
parents does not pose a sufficient threat to this right of their children." Id. at 323, 431
A.2d at 806-07.
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government objective. 24
Florida and South Carolina courts have summarily upheld the
constitutionality of their respective state parental liability acts.
The Florida District Court of Appeals concluded that the rational
basis of the statute is legitimately related to the deterrence ofjuve-
nile crime.'25 The court held that since "we feel the better view
supports constitutionality, we reverse and remand upon the well-
reasoned authority, which we adopt .... 9126
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that although "our
statute has never been construed, North Carolina's similar statute
was considered in General Insurance Company of America v.
Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E. 2d 645 (1963) and found to be
constitutionally within the state's police power."' 27 The South
Carolina court then restated the reasoning of Faulkner, 2 8 but did
not expressly hold the South Carolina statute constitutional. In-
stead, the court proceeded to apply the act to the facts of the
case.' 29 Apparently, the court intended that the Faulkner ration-
ale apply to the South Carolina act.
The constitutionality of New Mexico's parental liability statute
was recently upheld.' 30 Defendants primary claim was that the
1977 New Mexico act, as it existed in 1979 when plaintiff was in-
jured, was unconstitutional because parents were liable regardless
of whether or not they had custody and control of their child.' 31
The court agreed that the statute did not require parental control
for liability to attach to parents, but that this only raises a question
of the statute's "wisdom." The court properly observed that the
"wisdom of the statute, however, is not our concern; doubt as to
the statute's wisdom is not pertinent in determining whether the
statute is unconstitutional."'132
Defendants contended that the statute deprived them of equal
124. Id. at 324-25, 431 A.2d at 807.
125. Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). (Upheld constitu-
tionality of vicarious liability of parents whose children willfully destroy or steal
property).
126. Id. at 124-25, citing Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 431
A.2d 799 (1981); Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Hayward
v. Remick, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
127. Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786, 787 (1982). (Six year old
boy set fire to an apartment. Parents held liable for children's torts-court can cite
minor.)
128. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
129. Standard, 295 S.E.2d at 788.
130. Alber v. Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 645 P.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1982).
131. Id. at 103, 645 P.2d at 459. In 1981, the New Mexico legislature restored the
"custody and control" requirement to the statute. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-46
(1981).
132. A/ber, at 104, 645 P.2d at 460.
20
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protection since liability is imposed "solely because of their status
relationship to their daughter."1 33 The New Mexico court rejected
this argument on the ground that defendants failed to prove either
that the statute is applied unequally among all parents of children
who commit willful or malicious damage, or that such parents are
an improper class.134
The court also rejected defendants general claim that the statute
violated procedural due process by depriving them of property
without due process of law.135 Since the defendants failed to sug-
gest that procedural due process was denied, the court
recharacterized defendant's claim as a substantive due process is-
sue. The court concluded that there "is no violation of substantive
due process (by making the parents liable for the malicious or
willful tort of Monika) if the statute imposing liability was within
the scope of legislative authority (the police power), and if the
statutory liability accords with the purpose of the statute."' 36
Defendants relied on a Georgia court decision to show that the
New Mexico statute violated due process. The court distinguished
the Georgia decision on the ground that the Georgia statute pro-
vided full compensation while "our statute limits damage com-
pensation to a maximum of $2,500.00."137 Adopting the reasoning
of previous decisions upholding parental liability statutes,'3 8 the
court held that the New Mexico statute did not violate substantive
due process, since the legislature could properly determine that a
"parental liability statute was reasonably necessary."' 39
The Federal District Court of Hawaii upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Hawaii parental responsibility statute in 1982.140 As dis-
cussed earlier in Part II, Hawaii was one of two American states




136. Id. at 105, 645 P.2d at 461 (citation omitted).
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
139. Alber, at 106, 645 P.2d at 462 (citation omitted).
140. Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. 394 (D. Hawaii 1982). The opinion of
Judge Pence is a thoughtful and well reasoned analysis of the constitutional issues
underlying parental liability acts. The threshold issue before the court in Bryan con-
cerned the precedental authority of Piscataway, discussed supra notes 109-22 and ac-
companying text, which the United States Supreme Court dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question. Judge Pence concluded that this "disposition is the
equivalent to an affirmance on the merits. . . . This court is therefore bound by the
result in Piscataway to the extent that the two cases may involve the same legal is-
sues." 529 F. Supp. at 397 (citations omitted).
Judge Pence, however, concurred with defendants claim that the Hawaii statute,
and the facts, differed significantly from Piscataway, thus requiring "detailed consid-
eration of its [Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 577-3] alleged constitutional defects." Id.
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to vicarious liability. 14 ' The Hawaii statute differs from the laws
in other states in two respects: (1) there is imposition of unlimited
liability with regard to tortious acts, and (2) there is parental lia-
bility for negligent, as well as intentional torts of children.
The primary issue raised by defendants was that the statute in-
terferes with a parent's fundamental right to raise a family. They
argued that the statute discourages persons from having children
and interferes with the raising of children by placing a severe eco-
nomic burden on the parents.142 The court engaged in a well rea-
soned analysis of fundamental rights. It rejected defendants'
attempt to bring the Hawaii statute within the purview of the
United States Supreme Court decisions which hold that some per-
sonal choices affecting the family are important enough to be
deemed "fundamental."'' 43 The court declared that, unlike the
other interests held to be fundamental, the parental responsibility
act is not one that implicates personal choice. 44 The court con-
cluded that the presence of a threat of potential tort liability places
no real burden on the decision to have a child.' 45 The court
stated, in fact, that a statute may interfere with the parents' inter-
est in raising a family free from state imposed economic limita-
tions. 146 "Although some families may undergo financial strain as
a result of the statute, this fact alone does not establish encroach-
ment on a fundamental interest." 47
Since no fundamental right was involved, the court found that
the statute need only be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest. 48 The statute not only provides compensation for
tort victims149 but may also deter juvenile delinquency by encour-
aging parents to more carefully supervise their children. 150 De-
141. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
142. Bryan, 529 F. Supp. at 398.
143. Id. at 398-99.





149. Id. at 400. The court recognized that the imposition of vicarious liability is
justified by a public policy which holds that the person liable is in a position to
"spread the cost of the injury to the public at large through the purchase of liability
insurance." Id. (footnote omitted). The court found that this policy applies to par-
ents, who can purchase liability insurance and protect victims from bearing "the en-
tire cost of the injury suffered." Id. Moreover, the court noted that this "conclusion
is buttressed by the fact that almost all of the defendants in the present action are so
insured." Id. at 400 n.23.
In fact, the defendants in Bryan eventually settled for a total of $712,000.00, which
came from the "homeowners policies of the defendant parents." Letter from Steven
J. Trecker, supra note 33.
150. Bryan, 529 F. Supp. at 400.
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fendants argued that the statute is not tailored to meet the latter
objective since the statute imposes liability even where parents
have exercised care in supervising their children.151 The court dis-
missed this argument, concerning liability for a child's negligent
acts, by finding that a statute need not be perfect in order to have
a rational basis. 152
The court held the statute does not contain an unconstitutional
irrebutable presumption that natural parents are responsible for
the torts of their children regardless of due care or custody.' 53
The court concluded that this was basically an equal protection
argument since classification is the problematic issue. 5 4 The
court did state, however, that parents are not automatically liable
for all damages caused by their children, and at trial, may use all
the defenses available to their children.' 55
The defendants alleged that the statute discriminates against
natural parents by failing to impose liability on others who may
be equally responsible.' 56 The court found that natural parents
are not a suspect class, therefore singling out of natural parents for
liability need only have a rational basis. The court held that the
statute indeed has a rational basis but indicated that the statute
may be interpreted to require "a nexus between natural parentage
and a significant period of custody or control of the child."' 157
Although the courts have uniformly upheld the constitutionality
of state parental liability acts, the statutes have provided little gui-
dance for determining the scope and purpose of this legislation.
The Model Parental Liability Act which follows is proposed to
provide legislatures with a clear and simple means of achieving an
important social goal: the financial compensation and personal
vindication of victims of juvenile crime and delinquency. The
Commentary following the Model Act briefly outlines the effect
and intent of the operative terms and phrases used in the proposed
statute. The Commentary is not intended to be all inclusive, but
merely to provide a framework for understanding both the Model




153. Id. at 401.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 402.
157. Id. (footnote omitted). Compare Alber v. Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 645 P.2d 456
(Ct. App. 1982), discussed supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text, which held a
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL PARENTAL LIABILITY ACT
Section 1. Title.
This Act shall be known as The Parental Liability Act.
Section 2. Definitions.
As used in this Act:
(a) "Parent" means any person who has legal custody and con-
trol of an unemancipated minor or places himself in the posi-
tion of discharging parental rights, responsibilities, and
liabilities.
(b) "Unemancipated minor" means any individual who is not
the age of majority and is under the custody and control of a
parent.
(c) "Person" means any natural person, partnership, associa-
tion, private and public corporation, religious organization, the
United States and any governmental agency, and the State and
any agency or political subdivision.
Section 3. Liability.
A parent and unemancipated minor shall be jointly and sever-
ally liable for all actual damages to any person or property re-
sulting from the intentional commission of a tortious act by the
minor.
Section 4. Costs and Attorney's Fees.
The court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to
the prevailing party.
V. COMMENTARY
A. Section 2 Definitions
1. Section 2(a) -Parent. The Model Act's definition of "par-
ent" in Section 2(a) incorporates Section 2(c) of the Model Act
which defines the term "person." The definition of "parent,"
therefore, includes any individual or entity who acquires the sta-
tus of in loco parentis.158 This is a departure from state parental
liability acts which, with one exception, 159 fail to define the parties
liable under the act. The state acts simply use the word "parent,"
either alone or in conjunction with the words "guardian" or "in
locoparentis." Since the word "parent" at common law is strictly
construed, those state statutes which impose liability upon the
"parent" only, effectively limit liability to the "natural father or
158. "In loco parentis" has been defined as a person or entity "standing in the
place of, or instead of, a parent; one charged fictitiously with a parent's rights, duties
and responsibilities." Leverly v. United States, 162 F.2d 79, 85 (10th Cir. 1947).
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2001(2) (Purdon Supp. 1982) defines "parent" to
include "natural or adoptive parent."
24
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mother."160 Although statutes limiting liability to natural parents
are constitutional, 16 1 it is unreasonable for natural parents to
shoulder liability while other "persons" with identical parental
rights and responsibilities are not held liable.
Under the Model Act, state and federal governments as well as
private and public agencies are potentially liable parties. The de-
velopment of modem tort law has seen the erosion or abrogation
of the common law rule of sovereign immunity. 62 Many states
and the federal government have adopted this modem view. 63
If the state has custody and control of an unemancipated minor
and that minor commits a tort, the state should incur the same
liability now placed on other "parents." The purpose of the
Model Act, and many state acts, is to relieve the victim of fman-
cial hardship caused by the intentional harmful conduct of a mi-
nor. The Model Act equitably applies this policy to all parties.
Moreover, as a practical consideration, the government and public
or private agencies are generally insured. Since the purpose of
insurance is to compensate the injured party by spreading the cost
among the public, I ' 4 there exists no overriding financial burden or
public policy for denying recovery to the victim. 165
The Model Act treats all persons legally responsible for minors
equally. This expanded definition of "parent" must be considered
in the context of the growing number of children who, due to di-
vorce or changes in lifestyle, no longer live with one or both of
their natural parents. 166 The victim's right to financial recovery
160. See generally 67A C.J.S. Parent (1978).
161. See supra notes 63-64, 155-56 and accompanying text.
162. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL.
L. F. 919, 920-24.
163. Sellers, State Tort Liabilityfor Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J. L. &
Soc. PROB. 303, 310-22 (1977); Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in
the United States 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795, 796-810.
164. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at § 83. Bryan provides an excellent example of
the availability of insurance to protect against juvenile acts. See supra note 147.
165. Dean Prosser characterized the trend of the law as follows:
There is "a strong and growing tendency, where there is blame on neither
side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the
loss and hence shift the loss by creating liability where there has been no
fault . . . The problem is dealt with as one of allocating a more or less
inevitable loss to be charged against a complex and dangerous civilization,
and liability is imposed upon the party best able to shoulder it.
W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 75 at 494-95. Cf. Note, Holding Governments Strictly
Liablefor the Release ofDangerous Parolees, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 907, 908 (1980) "Not
only would victims be treated more equally under such a system of tort liability, but
holding the government strictly liable would best reconcile the competing social poli-
cies on which the institution of parole is based." See generally TASK FORCE ON VIO-
LENT CRIME, supra note 2, at 90-91.
166. See e.g. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage. 4 Dfferent Perspective,
28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1125 (1981); Glick, Children of Divorced Parents in Demographic
Perspective, 35 J. Soc. IssuEs 170 (1975); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: So-
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against a "parent" under the Model Act, therefore, is predicated
solely on a factual and legal determination of whether the "par-
ent" had "custody and contror' of the unemancipated minor at
the time of the tortious conduct.' 67
2. Section 2(b) - Unemancopated Minor. The Model Act de-
fines the term "unemancipated minor" to expressly include chil-
dren under the age of majority. This is consistent with the rule
that when a "minor attains the age of majority, emancipation oc-
curs automatically by operation of law." 68 Absent specific refer-
ence to age or state law, however, a parental liability act may
extend liability to parents of adult children. For example, several
state acts simply use the word "child" in the statute. 69 Although
courts may incorporate into the act the condition that the child be
a "minor" at the time of the tort, 170 statutory vagueness could re-
sult in liability to parents beyond legislative intent.
As discussed previously in Section 2(a), parental liability under
The Model Act is predicated upon a determination that the par-
ents had "custody and control" of the minor. 17 1 Avoidance of pa-
rental liability will therefore depend on the parent's ability to
prove as an affirmative defense that the minor was, as a matter of
fact or by operation of law, emancipated.172 Such a determination
has historically required judicial resolution of complex, and often
confused, issues of law and fact. 173 Commentators have criticized
cial and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1181(1981), Zaharoff, .4ccess to Children: Towards a Model Statute
for Third Parties, 15 FAM. L.Q. 165 (1981).
167. State courts have determined parental "custody and control" on the basis of
many factors, including actual physical custody of the minor or by operation of state
law. See, e.g., Flannigan v. Valliant, 400 So. 2d 225 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (liability of
father superceded by custody award to wife following divorce); Moore v. Crumpton,
306 N.C. 618, 295 S.E.2d 436 (1982) (parents separated, mother not liable since child
under the exclusive physical care of father); Poston v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co.,
107 Wis. 2d 215, 320 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1982) (liability did not attach to divorced
father not granted custody of minor).
168. Cady, Emancipation of Minors, 12 CoNN. L. REv. 62, 67 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Cady].
169. See Appendix I, infra.
170. See e.g. Alber v. Nolle, 68 N.M. 100, 103, 645 P.2d 456, 459 (Ct. App. 1982).
171. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
172. "Emancipation may not be presumed but must be expressly or impliedly
proven. Therefore, the burden was on the defendants to allege and prove, as an af-
firmative matter, that Douglas was in fact emancipated." Conrad v. Dickerson, 31111.
App. 3d 1011, 1012, 325 N.E.2d 67-68 (App. Ct. 1975).
173. See generally Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, Emancpating Our Children -
Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211, 214-32 (1973). Among the most
frequently considered factors are:
whether the child is living at home, whether the child is paying room and
board if living at home, whether the parents are exercising disciplinary con-
trol over the minor, whether the child is independently employed, whether
the child has been given the right to retain wages and spend them without
26
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this case-by-case method of determining emancipation as out-
moded "in light of modem, cultural, social, economic, and legal
conditions,"' 74 and encouraged the enactment of comprehensive
emancipation statutes similar to those adopted in California 75
and Connecticut. 176
The Model Act, as a matter of statutory construction, should be
consistent with applicable state laws. Thus, current problems in
determining the legal and factual criteria for emancipation will
inevitably arise under the Model Act. This is unavoidable unless
the Act includes a lengthy definition of "emancipation." Since
this is impractical and would conflict with the judicial and statu-
tory law in many jurisdictions, legislatures should consider enact-
ing modem emancipation statutes. Increased parental liability
necessitates clear standards from which parents can, with reason-
able certainty, ascertain whether they are liable for the torts of
their children and protect themselves by purchasing insurance or
seeking dissolution of their rights and responsibilities.
3. Section 2(c) - Person. The term "person" is defined in a
number of state parental responsibility acts. The purpose of these
definitions is to list the parties who may bring an action against
the parents of juvenile tortfeasors. The Model Act definition also
serves this function. In addition, the Model Act's definition of
"parent" clearly defines the parties who are liable under the
Act. 177
B. Section 3. Liability
1. Joint and Several Liability. In Section 3 of the Model Act,
the terms "parent" and "unemancipated minor" are followed by
parental restraints, whether the child is responsible for debts incurred and
the extent of the parents' contributions toward the payment of outstanding
bills, whether the child owns a major commodity such as a car, and whether
the parent has listed the child as a dependent for tax purposes. Age, of
course, is also a critical element.
Id. at 218 (footnotes omitted). Only marriage and enlistment in the Army have been
deemed sufficient in themselves to constitute emancipation. Id. at 217.
Butsee Albert v. Ellis, 7 Ohio Op. 3d 115, 359 N.E.2d 1033 (C.P. 1077) in which the
parents of a sixteen-year old, married, self-supporting son were held liable under the
Ohio Parental Responsibility Act. The court held that unless the "actual physical
custody and control" of the minor was taken from the parents by the state, the legisla-
ture intended to impose liability on all parents of children under eighteen regardless
of the factual relationship of parent and child. Id. at 118, 359 N.E.2d at 1036.
174. Cady, supra note 166, at 62.
175. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 60-68 (West Supp. 1982). See generally Cady, supra note
166, at 74-78.
176. CoNNm. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-150 (a-e) (West Supp. 1982). See generally
Cady, supra note 166, at 78-80.
177. See supra notes 156-65.
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the phrase "shall be jointly and severally liable."' 78 The purpose
of the Model Act is not served if the parent alone is held liable for
the acts of the juvenile. The juvenile should be liable to the extent
of his assets, if he possesses any. Thus, the Model Act encourages
victims to treat the parent and child as joint tortfeasors for the
purpose of satisfying a compensatory judgment.179 Although the
parent of the juvenile tortfeasor will often be responsible for pay-
ing the judgment, on those occasions where it is possible, the juve-
nile should contribute to the best of her ability.
2. Actual Damages. The Model Act permits recovery of actual
damages in accordance with the compensatory purpose of the
statutue. 180 The Act, however, diverges from most of the states in
that it has no ceiling on the amount which may be recovered from
the parent of a child tortfeasor. Although limitation may bear a
rational relationship to most injuries, many victims are left with
the bulk of their medical and repair expenses. 81 Unlimited re-
covery will not place an onerous burden on parents of juvenile
delinquents. The parent who is subject to a substantial judgment
would be accorded all the statutory, judicial and procedural safe-
guards available to any debtor. Furthermore, and as several
courts have recently pointed out, insurance is available to parents
for the purpose of providing coverage from this type of liability.18 2
In addition, current homeowner's insurance policies may protect
178. For a general discussion of the legal principles and problems underlying the
liability of joint tortfeasors, see W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at §§ 46-52.
179. See e.g., In re Appeal No. 321, 24 Md. App. 82, 84-85, 329 A.2d 113, 114 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1974) (mother ordered to make restitution for her son's mischief in a gro-
cery store); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Davis, 52 Ohio Misc. 26, 368 N.E.2d 336, 338
(Akron Mun. Ct., 1977). (Parents held jointly and severely liable where children are
involved in a common effort of destruction.)
180. "Compensatory damages and actual damages mean the same thing; that is,
that the damages shall be the result of the injury alleged and proved . Birdsal
v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64 (1876). It is also well-settled that:
[O]ne who sustains bodily injury may recover damages for past and future
physical pain and serious mental suffering accompanying such injury or
produced thereby. This includes fright and shock at the time of the injury,
pain during treatment, fear of future incapacity, and, in some states, the
humiliation produced by mutilation or disfigurement ....
C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 315 (1935). Thus, a "claim for bodily pain lets in mental
suffering. Damages for mental suffering if reasonable, are recoverable as compensa-
tion to which the claimant is entitled as a matter of right." Id. at 315-16. See Alber v.
Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 107, 645 P.2d 456, 463 (Ct. App. 1982), where the court held:
"Pain and suffering is an actual damage recoverable under the parental liability
statute."
181. See e.g., Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272 (1973). (Fourteen
year old boy attacked mother and daughter with a knife, hammer, and belt buckle.)
182. See Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. 394, 400 & nn. 22-23 (D. Hawaii 1982);
Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 321 n.8, 431 A.2d 799, 804-05 n.8
(1981).
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parents under certain circumstances. 183 Statutory limitations on
recovery operate exclusively to the detriment of the innocent vic-
tim particularly in the many cases where the parent is capable of
satisfying the judgment.
3. Person and Property. The Model Act and more than half
the states permit recovery for personal injury.'8 4 The remaining
states limit liability to property damage. This limitation is unten-
able and frustrates the policies underlying this legislation.
Juveniles are responsible for a large percentage of personal injury
inflicted on victims each year.'8 5 Those states forbidding recovery
for personal injury grant legislative immunity to those who inten-
tionally harm others while undermining the legislative attempt to
deter juvenile crime or provide aid to victims. Since some of the
most vicious and costly injuries to victims are physically inflicted
by juveniles, the denial of this remedy by the legislature is the
most egregious defect in current parental responsibility acts. 8 6
4. Intentional. State parental liability acts generally require
that the minor commit the tortious act "intentionally" or "will-
fully" for the victim to recover against the parent. 8 7 Although
many state acts also require that the tort be committed both inten-
tionally and with a "mischevious purpose, a design to injure or
any il-will,"18 8 several courts have held that malicious conduct is
183. See supra note 142. In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 52 Ohio Misc. 26, 368
N.E.2d, 336 (Akron Mun. Ct., 1977), the court concluded that "while standard home-
owners policies usually provide for an exclusion from such coverage for intentional
acts, a judgment against a minor's parents is not based on the parent's intentional act
and therefore is, not excluded." Id. at 29, 368 N.E.2d 339.
Another court adopted the following paradigm:
Assuming.4, B & C are each insured under the policy, and 4 and B are
independently liable in suits against them arising out of C's act there is no
provision of the contract which should be construed to deny them coverage
simply because C's coverage would be excluded if an action were brought
against him.
Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 12 Mich. App. 145, 150, 162
N.W.2d 676, 678 (Ct. App. 1968). (The insured's minor son stole an automobile and
damaged it through reckless operation).
184. See Appendix I, infra.
185. See generally supra note 4.
186. See, e.g., Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 618, 295 S.E.2d 436 (N.C. 1982).
187. Since the statutes require "intent" by the minor to commit the tort, the courts
have imputed the common law rule that "a minor's conduct should be judged by the
standard of behavior to be expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience
under like circumstances" into the terms of the statute. See, e.g., Walker v. Kelly, 6
Conn. Cir. Ct. 715, 314 A.2d 785 (Cir. Ct. 1973) (five year old); Lutteman v. Martin,
20 Conn. Supp. 371, 135 A.2d 600 (C.P. 1957) (nine year old); Connors v. Pantano,
165 Neb. 515, 86 N.E.2d 367 (1957) (four year old). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965). But see Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295
S.E.2d 786, 788 (1982) in which the court interpreted the South Carolina Act to mean
"no presumptions shall be indulged; minors of any age can commit intentional and
malicious torts."
188. Crum v. Groce, 192 Colo. 185, 187, 556 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1976).
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equivalent to intentional conduct.8 9 The Model Act adopts the
term "intentional" in Section 3, because it imports the clearest
standard of conduct, and is fair and consistent with the compensa-
tory purpose of the Act. The requirement that the minor's act be
"intentional" provides the parent with the opportunity to refute
the victim's contention that the minor acted with the "purpose of
causing such injury or with knowledge that the injury is substan-
tially likely to follow."' 90
The term "intentional" in The Model Act is contained in the
phrase "liable for all actual damages to any person or property
resulting from the commission of a tortious act by the minor."
Several courts have interpreted their state acts as limiting liability
to the precipitory intentional act only and have forbidden recov-
ery for injuries which resulted, or flowed, from the intitial tort.191
The language used in Section 3 of The Model Act specifically re-
jects this interpretation. Under The Model Act, the minor and his
parents are liable for any harm "resulting" from the commission
of the intitial tort.192 Section 3 of The Model Act, therefore, at-
taches liability to the parent if the victim can prove that the minor
committed an intentional act, resulting in injury to the victim.
The Model Act does not hold parents liable for the negligent
acts of their children.1 93 Although consistent with the purpose of
the Act, to compensate the victim, such a statute would probably
not be socially or politically palatable at the present time. The
increase in the availability of insurance may, however, eventually
eliminate the need for this distinction.
C. Section 4. Costs and Attorney's Fees
In some cases, a victim's damages are too small to warrant liti-
gation under ordinary circumstances. The Model Act encourages
a victim to seek compensation by permitting the judge the discre-
189. See Potomac Ins. Co. v. Torres, 75 N.M. 129, 401 P.2d 308 (1965). See also,
Sutherland v. Roth, 407 So. 2d 139 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); City of Medford v. Swar-
brick, 24 Conn. Supp. 320, 190 A.2d 493 (Super. Ct. 1973); Town of Groton v.
Medbery, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 671, 301 A.2d 270 (Cir. Ct. 1972); Ortega v. Montoya, 97
N.M. 159, 637 P.2d 841 (1981).
190. Crum v. Groce, 192 Colo. 185, 187, 556 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1976).
191. See e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Insur. Co. of Arkansas v. Henley, 275 Ark. 122,
628 S.W.2d 301 (1982); Crum v. Groce, 192 Colo. 185, 556 P.2d 1223 (1976); Peterson
v. Sloan, 56 Ohio St. 2d 255, 383 N.E.2d 886 (1978); Motorists Mut. Insur. Co. v. Bill,
56 Ohio St. 2d 258, 383 N.E.2d 880 (1978).
192. See, e.g., Potomac Insur. Co. v. Torris, 75 N.M. 129, 401 P.2d 308 (1965);
Schirmer v. Losacker, 24 Ohio Op. 3d 171, 434 N.E.2d 1388 (Ct. App. 1980); Francis
v. Farnham, 58 Or. App. 469, 648 P.2d 1349 (Ct. App. 1982).
193. See Appendix I, infra.
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tion to award costs and attorney's fees if the victim prevails.' 9 4 A
judge may award these expenses to assure the plaintiff just com-
pensation in cases involving small judgments. Moreover, the pos-
sibility that the plaintiff may recover these costs from the
defendant might encourage reluctant defendants to settle out of
court rather than risk the additional expense of litigation. Alter-
natively, litigation which is aimed at harrassing a defendant is dis-
couraged since the judge may assess these same expenses against
the plaintiff. The judge, of course, may also elect to allow both
parties to bear their own costs.
CONCLUSION
Defendant parents have challenged parental liability acts
largely on the grounds that these acts interfere with their funda-
mental right to bear and raise children, and violate due process
and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. The
courts, with one exception, have rejected these arguments and up-
held the constitutionality of the statutes. In only a few cases, how-
ever, have the courts engaged in an in-depth analysis of the issues
raised.
Several cases have specifically held that parental liability" acts
do not interfere with a "fundamental right" to bear and raise chil-
dren. The fact that a few parents may incur some financial cost is
not a great enough economic burden to interfere with a parent's
choice to have children.
Several courts, antipathetical to vicarious liability doctrines,
have concluded that the acts' only legitimate purpose is deterrence
of juvenile crime. It has not been conclusively shown, however,
that these acts encourage greater parental supervision of children,
thereby reducing the number of juvenile crimes. Thus, if the pur-
pose of the statute is deterrence, the act may not be rationally re-
lated to that goal. The courts have sidestepped this problem by
finding that the possibility that these statutes may effectuate the
desired result satisfies the rationality requirement.
Other courts have held that compensation of victims is a legiti-
mate state purpose in itself. If compensation is the legislative
goal, however, imposition of too low a ceiling on recovery may
not be rationally related that end. A victim's financial costs may
often exceed the limited ceiling established by many state statutes.
Nevertheless, the courts have consistently held that parental liabil-
ity acts bear a rational relationship to either deterrence or com-
194. Cf. Albert v. Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 108, 645 P.2d 456,464 (Ct. App. 1982). See
generally C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 65 (1935).
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pensation or both, and therefore reflect a legimate legislative
purpose.
For thirty years, state legislatures have acknowledged the need
to protect and compensate victims of juvenile crime and delin-
quency. The courts have supported the legislatures' prerogrative
to provide victims with an effective and equitable means of finan-
cial redress. The Model Act is a positive step in that direction.
Drafted in clear and simple language, it is hoped that the Model
Act will encourage victims to use this civil remedy. Moreover,
The Model Act's elimination of ceilings on recovery substantially
enhances the decisive role state legislatures have traditionally as-
signed tort law in fostering "increased consciousness of social re-
sponsibility, of social engineering."' 195 The Model Act is a
potentially successful means of achieving these goals.
195. Bischoff, The Dynamics of Tort Law: Court or Legislature, 4 VT. L. REv. 35,
43 (1979).
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